Moreover, the amphibious attackers stood a
good chance of seizing Malinta Hill before the Japanese garrison
could recover from the shock of preparatory air and naval
bombardment and the surprise of the parachute drop. In any case,
American troops would have to secure the hill before they could
clear the tail of Corregidor, Bottomside, and parts of
Middleside. Without the help of amphibious forces, the 503d RCT
would have to attack Malinta Hill across the open area of
Bottomside--an operation that, planners believed, would be most
unpleasant.
To minimize expected casualties during the
shore-to-shore attack, the amphibious troops would make their
assault two hours after the paratroopers started jumping. By
that time, planners expected, the parachutists would be able to
provide some fire support for the amphibious assault, while
Japanese attention would be largely diverted to the manifest
enormity of the situation on Topside.
To allow visually directed air and naval
bombardment as well as good visibility for the airborne assault,
planners scheduled the parachute jump for 0830 and set the
amphibious attack for 1030. The whole plan, of course, depended
upon generally fair weather; an inclement dawn on 16 February
would force postponement of both assaults.
Thus, carefully, planners made provision for
most eventualities. The great imponderable was, of course, the
Japanese reaction, and here Sixth Army and all other forces
involved were due for a surprise. Information concerning the
isolated Japanese garrison on Corregidor had been so scanty that
the estimate of 850 had, in fact, hardly attained the status of
an educated guess, even though it was necessary to use that
figure as a basis for planning. Actually, the Japanese had over
5,000 troops on Corregidor, all but 500 of them naval personnel.8
Corregidor and the other islands in Manila
Bay were garrisoned by the Manila
Bay Entrance Force under
Capt. Akira Itagaki, IJN, who reported to Admiral Iwabuchi in
Manila and whose headquarters was on Corregidor. Itagaki's
forces, which included three Army provisional infantry companies
and two Army provisional artillery batteries, were organized
into provisional units and assigned defensive sectors.
As Sixth Army expected, Captain Itagaki did
not anticipate an airborne envelopment. He had deployed his
troops for defense against amphibious attack and had placed his
strongest positions at James, Cheney, and Ramsay Ravines and at
Malinta Hill. Over half his troops were ready for action at
these points; the rest of the garrison he apparently kept in
reserve on Malinta Hill or in the tunnels below. A few men held isolated positions along the tail. Itagaki's
ravine defenses had no communication with each other or with
Malinta Hill. Wire communications from each strongpoint led back
to a central location on Topside, but even so it would be
difficult for Itagaki to move forces quickly from one position
to another around the periphery of Topside. Moreover, the early
destruction of the communications center would lead to complete
disruption of control. Thus, while he commanded a strong and
fairly well-armed force, Itagaki's means of controlling the
operations of his troops were extremely precarious.